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        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________________ 
NO. 10-2169 
____________________ 
WILLIAM P. BURROWS; OTTO G. BARTON, II; 
CHRIS WILLIAM BENDER; TERRY WALTER, 
                                                      Appellants 
v. 
TOWNSHIP OF LOGAN 
___________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
For the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil No. 3-05-cv-00458) 
District Judge:  Hon. Kim R. Gibson 
____________________ 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
February 7, 2011 
BEFORE:  JORDAN, GREENAWAY, JR., and 
STAPLETON, Circuit Judges 
________________________ 
(filed: March 2, 2011 ) 
________________________ 
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______________________ 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
______________________ 
STAPLETON, Circuit Judge: 
The District Court granted summary judgment to defendant Logan Township, 
Pennsylvania (“the Township”) on the Age Discrimination in Employment Act 
(“ADEA”) claims brought by Officers William Burrows, Otto Barton, Chris Bender, and 
Terry Walter (collectively, “Plaintiffs”), of the Township Police Department (“the 
Department”), after they were denied promotions.  Plaintiffs appeal.  We will affirm. 
I. 
 
A. 
 
 The Township retained the Police Education Research Forum (“the PERF”) to 
conduct an assessment of the Department, and the PERF issued two reports containing a 
total of thirty-six recommendations, including that the Department “implement a 
promotional process in order to fill much needed vacant supervisory positions.”  App. at 
201.  As a result, the Township Board of Supervisors (“the Board”), which was 
comprised of Frank Meloy, Jerome Fulare, and Diane Meling, authorized a three-part 
promotional process (an application, written test, and oral interview) and announced that 
two officers would be promoted to the rank of sergeant.  The Board issued a notice 
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describing the minimum qualifications and application process.  Eight officers, including 
Barton, Bender, and Walter, applied.  Burrows did not apply. 
 Thereafter, Burrows and Barton, along with Officer John Flinn, submitted a 
written grievance stating that “eleven [of the Department’s twelve officers] voted to 
grieve the [promotion] process as it was deemed to be unfair.”  Id. at 132.  At an 
executive session of the Board, Township counsel recommended, due to the grievance, 
that the new promotional process be scrapped and that the Board revert to simply 
appointing persons to the sergeant positions.  The Board accepted this recommendation; 
decided, based on the advice of Police Chief Ronald Heller, that three, rather than two, 
sergeants be appointed; and promoted Officer Flinn (then fifty-five years old), Officer 
David Hoover (then thirty-nine years old), and Officer Kenneth Patterson (then thirty-
seven years old), all of whom had applied.  At the time of the promotions, Burrows and 
Barton were fifty years old, Bender was forty-one years old, and Walter was forty years 
old. 
 Supervisor Meloy initially supported Officer Flinn, Officer Patterson, and 
Burrows, because “I thought they were the best officers to implement PERF ideas,” id. at 
282, including those dealing with community policing and problem-solving.  However, 
Supervisors Fulare and Meling were not in favor of Burrows because he had not applied, 
and so Supervisor Meloy in the end supported Officers Flinn, Patterson, and Hoover.   
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 Supervisors Fulare and Meling also supported Officers Flinn, Patterson, and 
Hoover.  Supervisor Fulare stated that Officer Patterson “came across as an honest 
person,” and “as I recall he was a proponent of community policing,” id. at 307, one of 
the PERF recommendations.  Supervisor Meling chose Officer Hoover because he “had 
assumed some of the responsibilities of an investigator, even though he wasn’t given 
those duties,” id. at 289, and she did not support Plaintiffs because they were in a group 
of officers who, according to the PERF, “didn’t seem to have the ability to work as a 
group to solve problems,” and were instead “working individually to deal with issues.”  
Id. at 291.  In addition, Barton had been identified as being resistant to the PERF 
recommendations, and “I was not interested in promoting somebody who really was not 
buying into the, into implementing the recommendations that PERF had recommended.”  
Id. 
B. 
 Burrows filed suit in the District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania, 
alleging that the Township “failed and refused to consider [him] for the position of 
Sergeant because of his age,” in violation of the ADEA.  Barton, Bender, and Walter then 
filed a separate complaint asserting the same claim against the Township.  The Township 
filed summary judgment motions with respect to both complaints, contending that 
Plaintiffs had failed to establish a prima facie case of age discrimination.  The District 
Court denied both motions. 
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 The cases were consolidated, and the Township again filed a motion for summary 
judgment, arguing that Plaintiffs failed to show that the Township’s proferred reasons for 
denying promotions to Plaintiffs were a pretext for age-based discrimination.  The 
District Court granted summary judgment to the Township on this ground.  Plaintiffs now 
appeal.  
II. 
 The District Court had jurisdiction over this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
 We review the District Court’s grant of summary judgment de novo.  DIRECTV 
Inc. v. Seijas, 508 F.3d 123, 125 (3d Cir. 2007).  We apply the same standard as the 
District Court in determining whether summary judgment was appropriate.  Congregation 
Kol Ami v. Abington Twp., 309 F.3d 120, 130 (3d Cir. 2002).  Thus, summary judgment 
was proper if, viewing the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and 
drawing all inferences in that party’s favor, there is no genuine issue of material fact and 
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  See Abramson v. William 
Paterson Coll., 260 F.3d 265, 276 (3d Cir. 2001); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). 
III. 
 
A. 
 
Plaintiffs contend that the “secretive” and “subjective” promotion process was a 
mask for age discrimination, asserting that “the Township kept both the criteria and the 
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process secret.”  Appellants’ Br. at 15, 17.  We have noted that “informal, secretive and 
subjective hiring practices are suspect because they tend to facilitate the consideration of 
impermissible criteria.”  EEOC v. Metal Serv. Co., 892 F.2d 341, 350 (3d Cir. 1990).  
However, originally, the Township clearly communicated the criteria and process it 
sought to use.  When the Board first decided to promote officers to sergeant, it issued a 
notice stating the experience and education applicants should have, providing the topics 
and specific questions applicants should address in their applications, and describing the 
new three-part promotional process.  This process was abandoned, though, because 
eleven officers, including Burrows and Barton, objected to it.  In support of their 
objection, they pointed out that in the then current “Logan Township Police Manual, . . .  
no promotional processes [were] described or defined,” and “the promotional positions 
are by appointment.”  App. at 132.  Thus, the Township reverted to the appointment 
system and abandoned the objective and transparent promotion system because virtually 
all of its officers objected to the new system and evidently favored promotions “by 
appointment.”  In these circumstances, the use of the appointment system does not raise 
an inference of age discrimination. 
B. 
 Plaintiffs argue also that certain inconsistencies between the Township’s proffered 
reasons for denying promotions to Plaintiffs and actions by the Township at the time of 
the promotions are sufficient to show pretext.  Specifically, Plaintiffs contend that: (1) the 
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Township’s explanation that it promoted Officers Flinn, Patterson, and Hoover because 
they would best implement the PERF recommendations is inconsistent with the fact that 
the Township had not established or discussed this criterion before the promotions were 
made; (2) promoting Officers Flinn, Patterson, and Hoover based on their ability to 
implement the PERF recommendations is inconsistent with the fact that the “Township 
was ignoring PERF’s recommendation to establish a procedure and criteria for the 
selection of sergeants,” Appellants’ Br. at 20; and (3) the fact that the Township retained 
Chief Heller and promoted Officers Hoover and Patterson, even though all of these 
individuals were critical of PERF, is inconsistent with denying promotions to Plaintiffs 
because they were critical of PERF. 
 We fail to see how these alleged inconsistencies are such “that a reasonable 
factfinder could rationally find them unworthy of credence, and hence infer that the 
employer did not act for [the asserted] non-discriminatory reasons.”  Fuentes v. Perskie, 
32 F.3d 759, 765 (3d Cir. 1994) (emphasis in original).  First, the Supervisors’ failure to 
discuss the PERF recommendations does not sufficiently cast doubt on the explanation 
that they sought applicants who would best implement those recommendations, especially 
given that the original vacancy notice directed applicants to discuss community policing, 
problem analysis, and leadership, all of which are important parts of the PERF 
recommendations.  See App. at 201 (“The Logan Township Police Department requires 
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leadership that possesses the capacity and the desire to manage the police department by 
utilizing the practices of community oriented policing and problem oriented policing.”). 
 Second, the Township did not ignore PERF’s recommendation to establish a 
procedure and criteria for the selection of sergeants.  In fact, as noted above, the 
Township established just such a procedure, but abandoned it because virtually all of its 
incumbent officers filed a grievance seeking to stop its implementation.  In light of this 
fact, we fail to see an inconsistency between the abandonment of the new procedure and 
the desire to implement the PERF recommendations. 
 As the District Court noted, the record reflects that Chief Heller criticized PERF as 
an organization and did not criticize its recommendations.  Accordingly, the fact that the 
Township retained his services is not inconsistent with Supervisor Meling’s opposition to 
Plaintiffs because of their resistance to the PERF recommendations.  In addition, 
Plaintiffs assert that they “heard Officers Hoover [and] Patterson . . . express criticism of 
PERF,” id. at 433 (Bender Affidavit), and that Officer Patterson “expressed criticism of 
PERF,” id. at 465 (Walter Affidavit), but there is no evidence that the Supervisors were 
aware of this alleged criticism from Officers Hoover and Patterson.  Thus, the promotions 
of Officers Hoover and Patterson are not inconsistent with denying promotions to 
Plaintiffs on the ground that they were critical of the PERF recommendations.  
C. 
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Finally, Plaintiffs contend that the District Court overlooked evidence of ageism in 
the Township, namely remarks made by Chief Rubin Moss, Chief Heller’s predecessor, 
whose tenure ended more than a year before the promotions; Supervisor James Patterson, 
who was no longer on the Board when the promotions were made; and Township 
Manager Bonnie Lewis, who was not entitled to vote on the promotions.  Relying 
principally on Brewer v. Quaker State Oil Refining Corporation, 72 F.3d 326 (3d Cir. 
1995), Plaintiffs contend that these remarks show that an ageist atmosphere existed 
amongst the Township leadership and that this atmosphere eventually manifested itself in 
Plaintiffs being denied promotions. 
 In Brewer, we held that “stray remarks by non-decisionmakers . . . may provide 
some relevant evidence of discrimination,” and thus “may . . . be considered by the jury as 
evidence of the corporate culture in which the employment decision to discharge [a 
plaintiff] was made.”  Brewer, 72 F.3d at 333-34; see also Walden v. Georgia-Pacific 
Corp., 126 F.3d 506, 521 (3d Cir. 1997) (“[S]uch remarks can . . . constitute evidence of 
the atmosphere in which the employment decision was carried out.”).  However, we made 
clear in Walden that “comments by those individuals outside of the decisionmaking chain 
are stray remarks, which, standing alone, are inadequate to support an inference of 
discrimination.”  Walden, 126 F.3d at 521 (emphasis added). 
 We made this point even more clearly in Ezold v. Wolf, Block, Schorr & Solis-
Cohen, 983 F.2d 509, 545 (3d Cir. 1992), where we held that sexist comments by a law 
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firm partner not involved in the decision to pass over a female associate for partnership 
were not “sufficient in and of themselves to . . . show that there was such a pervasive 
hostility toward women at [the firm] sufficient to show that [the] partnership decision was 
more likely the result of discriminatory bias than [the firm’s] perception of [the 
associate’s] legal ability.”  Id. at 547 (emphasis added).  We explained: 
If we were to hold that several stray remarks by a 
nondecisionmaker over a period of five years, while 
inappropriate, were sufficient to prove that [the firm’s] associate 
evaluation and partnership admission process were so infected 
with discriminatory bias that such bias more likely motivated 
[the firm’s] promotion decision than its articulated legitimate 
reason, we would spill across the limits of Title VII. 
 
Id.  We distinguished Ezold from Lockhart v. Westinghouse Credit Corp., 879 F.2d 43 
(3d Cir. 1989), overruled on other grounds as recognized in Starceski v. Westinghouse 
Elec. Corp., 54 F.3d 1089, 1099 n.10 (3d Cir. 1995), in which we deemed relevant to an 
ADEA claim an ageist remark made by an executive of the employer, by noting that 
“[t]he other evidence supporting the verdict in favor of the plaintiffs in Lockhart, unlike 
the evidence in the present case, was substantial,” and that the partner in Ezold “took no 
part in the final votes or evaluations concerning [the associate’s elevation to partnership] 
because he had by that time left the firm.”  Ezold, 983 F.2d at 546-47. 
 Here, had there been other evidence of age discrimination, the remarks of Chief 
Moss, Supervisor Patterson, and Manager Lewis may well have been admissible to show 
the atmosphere in which the promotions decisions were made.  However, as in Ezold, 
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these individuals were not entitled to vote on the promotions, and, as explained above, 
other substantial evidence of age discrimination is lacking.  Thus, the statements of Chief 
Moss, Supervisor Patterson, and Manager Lewis are stray remarks by individuals outside 
of the decisionmaking chain that are insufficient to defeat summary judgment.  
IV. 
Plaintiffs have failed to make a sufficient showing that the Township’s proffered 
reasons for denying promotions to Plaintiffs were a pretext for age discrimination.  Thus, 
we will AFFIRM the judgment of the District Court.    
